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Abstract 
During the 40 years (1949-1989) of centralized management of the 
economy, Romania was transformed from an agrarian-industrial country 
into an industrial-agrarian country, but not beyond the stage of a 
developing country. 
Planning the formation of the accumulation fund and the fixed funds 
allocation made possible to faster diversify and increase the industrial 
production.  
In a first stage, during the 8th decade (1971-1980), the increase in 
imports of capital goods needed in industries’ technology revamping 
engendered the growth of Romania’s foreign debt.  
In the 9th decade, the policy of forced payment of previously 
accumulated foreign debt was achieved by aggressive compression of 
imports and boost of exports. 
At the end, in 1989, Romania’s foreign trade structure corresponded 
almost completely to the structure of the supply from the countries 
producing industrial processed goods. From this point of view, Romania 
became, after four decades of accelerated development, an acceptable client 
to Western exporters. 
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The increased pressure entailed by the payment of the external debt 
as well as the agrarian-industrial character of the Romanian economy until 
1940 led to the adoption of the accelerated industrialization solution. 
The need to adopt a consistent policy of industrialization was 
already consecrated by the overwhelming majority of economic works in the 
interwar period, as industrialization was considered the only effective way 
of achieving the macroeconomic balance.  
The experience of the 80 years of (1859-1939) transition to capitalism 
had highlighted serious inadequacies of the economic systems of the ‘lagging 
behind’ countries slow pace of economic growth, internal inequalities in 
regional development, ever more pronounced social segregation, dependence of 
the capacity to pay the country’s foreign debt on the instability of the 
agricultural production respectively on the exports of raw materials and semi-
products, maintaining a relatively small internal urban market, the agricultural 
relative overpopulation, lack of qualified personnel for non-agricultural sectors, 
maintaining a high level of illiteracy, etc. 
Countries at the beginning of industrialization could hope for an 
intensive development, partially recovering the gaps towards industrialized 
countries only by accelerating industrial development. It was relatively easy 
to justify and support such an imperative, but almost impossible to achieve 
it within the capitalist system already applied for 80 years. 
Forecasting calculations were daunting about the possibilities of 
interwar Romania. The most delicate problem was the chronic shortage of 
funds, the scarcity of capital for public and private investment. Foreign 
capital invested in Romania contributed sequentially in several sectors only, 
and as duration in the short and medium term to the development of 
economic sectors.  
Government budget revenues would not have been able even in the 
most optimistic estimates to cope extensive investment programs. One 
example is illustrative: developing national energy system (not to mention 
upgrading the infrastructure or mechanization of the agriculture). 
Until 1940, the Romanian capital private initiative remained 
relatively dominant at the small and medium enterprises level. For “peak” 
sectors at the time (mining, oil refining, wood) foreign capital was 
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prevailing which, as we were saying, could have only a limited and 
temporary positive influence for overall economic growth of the country. 
The industrialization of the country would become the axis of 
socialist economic policy. Domestic capital accumulation and planned 
investments distribution on sectors of the economy were to ensure high 
growth rates, specific to a forced, accelerated development, impossible to 
achieve within the conditions of the market economy known until 1940. 
 
The international institutional framework – solving the problem of 
the external market to accelerate the development of socialist economies 
Dating back to the sixteenth century, the debate of ideas on ways to 
ensure the economic growth of a country focuses more strongly, since the 
second half of the nineteenth century, on the importance of foreign trade.  
Foreign market expansion in terms of the classical theory of 
international trade (Smith-Ricardo-Mill) would not have to be a significant 
problem, as each country could participate in the international values 
exchange “with what had been destined”.  
Thus, if a country could naturally produce satisfactory amounts in 
cereals, bananas, coffee, saltpetre, oil or diamonds, for example, according 
to the principles of free trade, that country only had to change its products 
for those of other countries ensuring the demand for those goods that could 
not be naturally achieved from salt, pepper, oranges, glass, mirrors, nails 
and rails to machinery, drilling rigs and refinery and, nowadays, computers. 
Thus, the international trade of goods and services produced in 
compliance with the international labour division and free trade principles 
should vouch to all participants’ advantages and benefits, enshrining peace 
and universal harmony. 
The period of new great powers industrialization, such as Germany 
and the US, led to a reassessment of the international trade theory and, 
especially, to questioning the effectiveness of the application of generalized 
free trade. It developed so with increasing virulence, especially after 1880, 
the re-escalation of mercantilist practices from the dawn of capitalism, now 
called protectionism.  
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The most serious curtailment of confidence in the “healthy” 
character of free trade principles brought by the protectionist theory targeted 
the very foundation of these principles: within the international trade were 
not exchanged goods based on equivalence according to the prices of goods 
and services, but exchanges of non-equivalence given by disparities between 
the levels of productivity of production factors (natural factor: the soil, 
human: the labour, social-economic: the capital). 
The expansion of the European market after 1850 brought with it a 
worsening issue: the acknowledgement of economic disparities between 
countries and their aggravation. The limits of expansion of the developed 
Europe economy revealed with increasing obviousness.  
By 1914, however, the general operation of the two fundamental 
systems (the gold standard monetary system and the multilateral trade) 
assured an overall development of the European economy, even though the 
widening gaps continued to become chronic. 
Following the serious distortions of the international economic 
relations during the 1930-1940 period, became clear the need for a radical 
restructuring of the international trade regime, as well as the imperative of 
accelerating growth in the areas designed for the developed economies 
expansion. 
Increasingly striking warning signals began to be heard highlighting 
a serious threat to the continued economic growth of developed countries: 
through the further aggravation of economic disparities, the competitive 
advantage held by these countries resulting from the international division 
of labour risked to be left without the appropriate markets, clearly leading 
to the decline of large or small industrialized states.  
In order to regulate international economic relations after 1944, in 
addition to the reorganization of the League of Nations under its new name 
of United Nations Organization (UNO), a number of new institutions was 
established such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), etc.  
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The chances of the countries at the beginning of their industrialization 
to compete with industrial competitive products in the international market 
along with the increasingly progress due to faster technological change in 
developed countries were virtually nil.  
For the new bloc of socialist countries shaped after 1945, the 
solution to the foreign market issue was the establishment of the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in 1949.  
Among other functions (planning correlation, foreign exchange, 
financial assistance, etc.), the CMEA market was meant to ensure the supply 
of raw materials and the sale of industrial and agricultural products of each 
member country on more favourable terms than those offered by the 
Western markets. 
 
The purpose of the industrialization policy 
The stated objective of socialism was the country's transformation 
from agrarian-industrial to industrial-agrarian. Romania was to develop 
“multilaterally” to acquire a structure of sectors and a quantitative and 
qualitative level comparable to those of developed countries. 
For countries with a low level of industrial development, the prevalent 
development of heavy industry was considered the unique and secure way to 
ensure a rapid and seemingly sustainable development of economies as a 
whole. Moreover, the Soviet experience itself (1927-1945) represented a 
confirmation of the expected success in other developing countries. 
 
Historical prerequisites of Romania’s industrialization 
During the eight decades of capitalism establishing (1859-1939), the 
Romanian economy was gradually drawn into the circuit of Western values. 
In this new context Romania had to start its modernization process. 
The modernization of the Romanian society required public 
borrowing which brought about the foreign debt increase. In order to pay the 
foreign debt tontines, Romania had to secure the necessary foreign currency 
liquidity. But the Romanian economy depended largely, especially until the 
early twentieth century, on its agricultural output. Romania’s export 
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capacity and therefore the ability to import were determined by the annual 
level of agricultural production. 
The seasonal nature of agriculture and the influence of the climate 
engendered the instability of the agricultural production. Therefore, the 
fluctuations in agricultural output caused serious imbalances both domestically 
and in the international economic relations. Depending on agriculture, 
Romania’s international payment capacity was uncertain, affecting the financial 
potential to support imports. 
Industrialization was supposed to attract a large part of the labour 
force surplus in rural areas, while the phenomenon of relative agricultural 
overpopulation had become a serious demographical and economic problem 
during the interwar period. 
In academia, in the press, as well as among politicians and even in 
the business environment the necessity of developing a powerful industry 
had become a dominant idea until 1940. Moreover, under the dictatorship of 
development, the accelerated and forced industrialization of Romania has 
become the main focus of the leadership of socialist Romania.  
 
The industrialization strategy during socialism  
The policy of industrialization meant developing with priority the 
heavy industry producing investment goods (capital goods) or “means of 
production”, as they used to say at that time.  
The idea of the priority development of these sectors was neither by 
the Bolsheviks nor by the communists inspired. The economic literature had 
already shaped a school of thought which argued the meaning of this 
strategy: developing the national productive forces [List, 1841] could be 
complete and real only by developing mainly the sectors with a labour 
productivity above the national average [Manoilescu, 1929].  
Particularly encouraging for LDCs industrialization imperative 
argument, were also the findings of the League of Nations study 
Industrialisation et commerce extérieur published in 1945. The solution 
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suggested by the authors of the study targeted the financial sources for 
industrial investments in national accumulation.1  
The historical experience of the previous 80 years of establishing 
capitalism in Romania had shown that domestic capital accumulation was 
extremely low compared with the needs of economic and social 
modernization. On the other hand, it was estimated that autonomous foreign 
capital investments in industries of the countries at the beginning of their 
industrialization will not be sufficient to cover the necessary.  
Therefore, one of the functions of the socialist government was to 
force the domestic capital accumulation. On that effect, the planned 
distribution of the national income as accumulation fund and consumption 
fund was the way of achieving the necessary investment funds. The trend of 
the single (communist) party policy aimed at achieving a certain balance 
between the two funds.  
Planning extremely high growth rhythms resulted in high rates 
scheduled for the accumulation fund to the detriment of consumption. 
Basically, within the framework of the development dictatorship, the 
totalitarian leadership aimed at raising increasingly larger investment funds 
(during 1961-1980) from a five-year plan to another, by restricting the 
household consumption.  
The industrialization policy adopted in socialism has followed from 
the beginning the intensive development of heavy industry (the Group “A” 
sectors, producing capital goods) i.e. the extractive, metallurgical, chemical, 
electrical industries, etc. and especially the machine and equipment industry. 
Machine and equipment industry was considered the “backbone” of the 
national economy: on its development depended the real economic 
independence of the country. 
The funds allocated to Group “B”, respectively to sectors of industry 
producing consumer goods (food, textile, footwear, etc.) were significantly 
lower than those allocated to Group “A”.  
                                                           
1
 See Industrialisation et commerce extérieur, Société des Nations, 
Genève, 1945. 
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Increasingly more pronounced in the 80s were felt the Romanian 
economy autarky attempts, focusing on severe curtailment of imports, 
relying on domestic industry’s production capacity, which was not really 
stimulated. 
Despite the controversies related to the usefulness, purpose and 
effectiveness of industrialization, it is obvious that after 40 years of forced 
development, in 1989 Romania’s economic structure was significantly 
changed: the industry became the main sector. 
 
The relation between industrialization and foreign trade 
The transition to socialism, in general, and in the countries of South-
eastern Europe in particular was done forcibly, through the intervention of 
Soviet troops. For a number of countries, socialism was considered the most 
effective solution to accelerate the development and growth in as short as 
possible historical times. Imposing “the good” by force was achieved by the 
“dictatorships of development” under socialism.  
Forced development, labelled as socialism, was largely the 
continuation of civilizing by force – the force of the market – under the label 
of modernization and capitalism, which began in Romania with the reign of 
Alexandru Ioan Cuza. 
The association of the industry evolution with that of foreign trade is 
not accidental. Until the First World War and then until 1940 all been 
written and talking about the difficulty, not to say “impossibility”, to 
develop industry in Romania, namely generally in little or no industrialized 
countries, first due to the limited internal and external market. 
The domestic market problem would be solved by socialism through 
urbanization and increasing rural demand for industrial products. The limits 
of foreign market remained a challenge to identify the outlets inherent in the 
forced industrialization of the socialist countries. The industrialisation 
required external transactions growth, not only for raw materials supply but 
especially for exports of processed (manufactured) products. 
It was easy to imagine that Romanian industry products and, 
generally, of the industry of most socialist countries in different stages of 
the early industrialization would not have faced competition in Western 
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markets. To be “competitive” in the foreign market, the socialist countries 
needed an own market, relatively isolated from competition specific to large 
industrial producers. 
The solution adopted was the creation of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA) in 1949.  
 
Synthetic indicators of the industry evolution between 1950 and 
1989  
The industry’s development and modernization is reflected by the 
summarized evolution of the number of enterprises, labour input and the 
dynamics of synthesis indicators. 
The share of financial resources for achieving industrial investment 
respectively the share of accumulation fund in national income were greater 
than those destined to other sectors. The intense focus on industry 
development materialized in the increase in number of the industrial units.  
The number of industrial enterprises increased from year to year, 
from 1658 in 1950 to 2102 in 1989, the republican subordinated being net 
“favourite” to local subordinated ones. It should be well understood that the 
number of enterprises is not an eloquent indicator by itself. What mattered 
in the first place was the size of the enterprise; the republican subordinated 
had a much larger size.  
The investment effort inherent in the establishment of such industrial 
“mastodons” was exceptional. The evolution of locally subordinated 
enterprises was tortuous, reflecting the diminishing interest in local industry 
development.  
It was thus confirmed the need for priority development of large 
industrial enterprises stipulated by Mihail Manoilescu, Ştefan Zeletin and 
others, thus being virtually diminished the importance of National Peasants’ 
Party’s vision about the development of industries connected to agriculture, 
located mainly in rural areas. 
The structure of employment has radically changed in 1989 
compared to 1938 and 1950. In 1930 the share of employment in industry 
was 7.7% of total employed population, while the urban population share 
was 21.4%.  
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Romania’s transformation from an agrarian-industrial country into 
an industrial-agrarian country is reflected, among other indicators, by the 
ratio change of industry and agriculture employment shares.2 In this respect, 
the period 1970-1980 was decisive: the share of employment in agriculture 
decreased from 49.1% to 29.4%, while the share of employment in industry 
increased from 23% to 35.5%. 
Consequently, compared to the beginning of the period (1950), in 
1989 the demographic indicators structures distributed by urban-rural areas 
and labour distributed by sectors were radically altered. The population 
employed in industry increased more than fourfold, from 1 million in 1950 
to 4.1 million in 1989; the share of employment in industry increased from 
11.9% to 38.1% of total employed in the economy, while the share of 
employment in agriculture declined from 74.1% to 27.5%. 
Forced industrialization also engaged the accelerated urbanization 
process. In 1989 the urban population had a share of 53.2% of the total 
population, having increased from about 3 million in 1938 to 5.5 million in 
1956, namely more than 11 million inhabitants in 1989, i.e. almost four 
times compared to 1938.  
 
Industry’s contribution to the formation of Social Product and 
National Income 
The increased importance of the industry in the national economy is 
reflected first by the contribution of this sector to the formation of social 
product (SP) and national income (NI). 
Industry’s contribution to the formation of Social Product increased 
from 39% in 1938 to over two-thirds in 1989, while the share of industry in 
National Income rose from 30.8% to only 58.1%. The differences between 
the weights of the two indicators, for example in the years 1938, 1960 and 
1989, were caused by sharper increase in material costs. Thus, the share of 
expenditures made in industry in total material costs rose over the same 
period from 36.6% to 71%. 
                                                           
2
 Romanian Statistical Yearbook, 1990, p. 51; A. Bondrea, Starea naţiunii 2000. 
România încotro?, Editura Fundaţiei România de Mâine, Bucureşti, 2000, p. 195. 
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The investment effort devoted to industrial development was 
remarkable. The investment in the industry held the largest share of total 
investment in the economy, i.e. between 43% and 50% (maximum reached in 
1986), increasing from about 2.4 billion in 1950 to over 124 billion lei in 1986.  
Increased investment brought about the industrial production 
growth which recorded the maximum increase (calculated in comparable 
prices) of 44 times in 1989, compared with an investment increase 
(calculated at current prices) of only 37.2 times versus base year 1950. 
The apparent increase in investment efficiency can be inferred from 
the comparison with the investment dynamics of industrial production 
compared to 1980 as a year of reporting. While investments diminished from 
93% in 1985 to 83% in 1989, industrial production increased from 120% to 
133%, showing a slight decrease in 1989 compared to 1988. The industrial 
production growth however was not the result of net investments, but of the 
average longer operating period of fixed assets in previous periods.  
The efficiency of fixed assets in the industry, after a real growth 
recorded during 1970-1980, diminished in the last decade. National income 
realized in the industry related to the value of fixed assets in the industry fell 
on average annually by 3.4% during 1981-1985 and 8.5% during 1986-
1989. [Constantinescu, 2000] 
Factors leading to reduced efficiency of fixed assets were: the over-
endowment with fixed assets of enterprises; long-term effects of the energy 
and raw materials world-crisis (1973-1979) which led to early degradation 
of imported technologies; reducing domestic and external demand for some 
industrial products (tractors, agricultural machinery, energy and oil 
equipment, lathes, etc.); imbalances within enterprises through retrofitting 
gaps between sections; breakdowns and faults caused by the lack of spare 
parts or the incomplete providing of fixed assets servicing mainly after 
imports restricting during 1982-1989.  
Dispersal of investment destination in the last decade of socialism 
has generated unsustainable programs and planning of production and 
labour. These causes have led to run time extending and delaying to operate 
the objectives by 2-5 years and more. 
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The evolution of output and investments by industrial sectors 
between 1950 and 1989 
The structure of industry sectors has changed, focusing on the 
development of heavy industry sectors (Group A). Group A share in total 
industrial production increased from 45.5% in 1938 to 52% in 1950 and 
72.5% in 1989 with a corresponding reduction of the Group B share 
(consumer goods).3 
For the Group A the highest increases in the share of production 
volume were recorded by the following sectors: the share of industry 
engineering and metal processing increased from 10.2% in 1938 to 13.3% in 
1950 and 27.7% in 1989; similarly the share of chemical industry 
production went from 2.7% to 3.1% and 9.8%, while non-ferrous and 
ferrous metallurgy increased from 6.7% to 7.5% and 9, 8% respectively.  
Group B sectors producing consumer goods marked shares 
decreases, even if their production has increased in the period under review. 
The share of food industry production decreased from 32.4% in 1938 to 
24.2% in 1950 and 11.6% in 1989. For textile industry, the evolution of its 
share in total industrial production was upwards, from 9.4% in 1938 to 
11.1% in 1950 and declining to 6.6% in 1989. 
Increasing production of the different sectors followed the same 
array of development with emphasis on heavy industry.  
The most significant increases in production were recorded by the 
chemical industry – 221 times, and machine building – 158 times, far above 
the industry average as a whole, while light industries increases were below 
the average of industry’s total respectively 24 times for the textile industry 
and only 11 times for the food industry. 
In the period 1950-1989 the average annual growth of industrial 
output as a whole was 10.2%, being surpassed by Group A (11.1%) 
represented by the Chemical industry (14.9%) and Non-metallic minerals 
extraction and abrasive products industry (14.7%), Engineering and 
metalworking (13.9%), Coke-chemical (12.8%), Electricity and Building 
materials (11.2%). 
                                                           
3
 Romanian Statistical Yearbook, 1990, p. 452-455. 
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Table no. 1. Industrial production dynamics of some main  
branches between 1950-1989 
       - % - 
  1950 1960 1970 1980 1989 
Industry, total, of which 100 340 1100 3300 4400 
Chemical industry 100 658 5400 17800 22100 
Machines engineering 100 585 2700 11000 15800 
Building materials 100 409 1600 4700 6200 
Wood processing 100 317 986 2000 2600 
Food 100 238 489 939 1100 
Textile 100 235 655 1900 2400 
Apparel 100 241 736 2400 4100 
 
Source: Romanian Statistical Yearbook, 1990, p. 432-433. 
 
The main beneficiaries of intensifying investments were oil 
processing industry, electricity and thermal energy, metallurgy and 
chemical industries in which there were invested between 48%-75%. 
[Constantinescu, 2000] 
The investment effort has not been evenly distributed over the 45 
years. Completion of industrial investments and fixed assets operating 
required different periods of time by the industry in question. Therefore 
stepping up investment process is best reflected by the investment dynamics 
outmatching by fixed assets dynamics index – 1.16 in the period 1966-1975, 
namely 1.32 between 1976 and 1980.  
Between 1980 and 1989 statistical data on production and 
investments in the industrial sector reflect contradictory developments of the 
two indicators.  
Overall, with a few exceptions (the garment industry, for example), 
the last decade of the reviewed period investment growth was below the 
level reached in 1980, while the industries output was considerably higher 
than in 1980 (Machinery industry and Metal processing, Chemical, etc.).  
The explanation for increased production, while reducing investment 
growth to 1980, is the time gap between the period of maximum investment 
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efforts and the lag to operate the respective fixed assets. In the case of highly 
productive sectors (most industries in Group A), increased investment was 
made approximately between 1960 and 1980. In a limited number of sectors, 
investment effort continued after 1980. 
With a diversified structure, providing the bulk of the domestic 
demand of consumer goods and, in the 9th decade, most demand of capital 
goods, despite halting the refurbishment and despite the extension of the 
useful life of fixed assets, the Romanian economy was far from being “a pile 
of scrap”. 
The lucid observation of maintaining and worsening the gap from the 
front-developed and even some developing countries must be supplemented 
by a clear understanding of the realistic possibilities of a forced-accelerated, 
artificial development. The industrialization of Romania had achieved its 
historic goal: the compatibility of the domestic demand for consumer 
goods with the developed countries supply structure. 
Reducing the volume of investments in the decade 1980-1989 was 
caused both by restricting imports and the sustained effort to pay the foreign 
debt, as one of the major sources to cover investments in the economy in 
general, and in particular in the industry, was consisting of external loans by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). 
 
The foreign debt of Romania between 1976 and 1989 
Insufficient domestic financial resources for investment were one of 
the defining characteristics of the economic evolution of Romania between 
1859 and 1939. The appeal to foreign capital had become more insistent 
during conservative governments (1888-1900), respectively during the 
National Peasants’ Party ruling between 1929 and 1933. 
The domestic capital accumulation achieved through the autarkical 
policy applied by socialism, as well as the cooperation relations within the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) should have been 
sufficient for providing growth resources. But the development acceleration 
efforts after 1965 proved these were not sufficient. 
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Promoted openness to the West after 1965 and especially after 1968 
brought Romania within the International Monetary Fund since 1972.  
 
Table no. 2. The foreign debt of Romania during 1976-1981 
     - Million US dollars - 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Romania’s foreign debt 2876 3684 5170 7342 9810 10546 
 
Source: N.N. Constantinescu, Istoria economică a României, vol. II, Editura Economică, 
2000, p. 376. 
 
In, we could say, a necessary way, given the highly accelerated 
growth planned for the period 1976-1985, Romania began to make 
increasingly more consistent loans abroad to cover the imports of 
technologies, machines, equipment, and machinery from the industrialized 
countries. Foreign currency commercial loans designed to support these 
imports came from various banks, as well as from the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). In 1976 the foreign debt consisted 
of $ 864 million from banks and $ 2.012 billion from international financial 
institutions. In just six years the total debt reached $ 10.546 billion, of which 
10.160 billion in convertible currencies, marking an increase of 3.6 times.  
Most of the external debt consisted of medium and long-term loans 
for development or modernization to provide the industry with advanced 
technology and equipment. Medium and long-term debt increased 3.2 times, 
from 2.4 billion in 1976 to $ 7.7 billion in 1981. Current revenues coming in 
mostly from exports could not cope with increasing debt pressure incurred 
particularly in the period 1978-1981, so in 1981 the arrears had reached $ 
1.1 billion. 
Therefore, at the beginning of the 9th decade Romania was facing a 
real foreign debt crisis occurred only eight years after becoming an IMF 
member. 
Romanian state foreign debt crisis was caused, in addition to 
massive imports of capital goods, by the following factors: 
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a. Changing of oil and raw materials market conjuncture by oil crisis 
outset (1973-1979), which created an exceptionally heavy burden by 
increasing the prices of these products (the oil bill). 
b. Higher oil prices added the increasingly higher crude oil imports, 
inherent in the 8th decade of accelerated development, which had reached 
45% of the total Romanian imports in convertible currencies. 
c. In addition to collecting medium and long-term debt, an 
aggravating role was played by the increased short-term foreign loans, 
which share in total external debt went from 4% in 1976 to 22% in 1980. 
d. Western banks have tightened credit conditions for socialist 
countries following the collapse of Poland. 
In order to solve the foreign debt crisis, Romania has turned to the 
IMF support, which was conditioned by the achievement of an adjustment 
program to ensure the necessary currency liquidity and rescheduling loans 
from foreign banks. 
Following the implementation of the adjustment program, since 
1982 the current account recorded surpluses: 
 
Table no. 3. Evolution of the current account balance of Romania 
1981-1989 
       - Million dollars - 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Foreign trade balance 103 1814 1869 2312 1772 1680 2178 3750 2050 
Current account balance -833 1040 1160 1719 1381 1395 2043 3922 2514 
  
Source: N.N. Constantinescu, Istoria economică a României, vol. II, Editura Economică, 
2000, p. 377. 
 
It is remarkable that after six years (1982-1987) of foreign trade 
balance surpluses that ensured a current account positive balance, in 1988 
and 1989 the current account surpluses exceeded net exports (by $ 172 
million in 1988, and $ 464 million respectively in 1989)! 
Before unfolding the process of forced payment of foreign debt, after 
rescheduling the public debt, the external debt service was the following: 
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Table no. 4. Rescheduling and repayment of external debt during  
1986-1989 
- Million dollars - 
 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 după 1990 Total 
Foreign debt rescheduled 6395*) 5013 3456 2386 1710 - - 
Rescheduled reimbursements - 1382 1557 1070 676 1709 6394 
Effective reimbursements - 356 4252 1790 - - 6398 
Effective external debt at 31 December 6912**) 6556 2304 514 - - - 
 
Sources: (1) NBR Annual Report, 1998, Statistical Section, Table 17, p. 57*. 
 (2) N.N. Constantinescu, op. cit., p. 378-379. 
 
Notes: 
*)
 Rescheduled foreign debt was calculated using data from source (2) from the 
opening balance of $ 6.395 billion and then successively decreasing the reimbursed 
rescheduled amounts in the second row. Rescheduled foreign debt (6.395 billion dollars) 
differs from the actual of 6.912 billion dollars, according to NBR updates “considering 
rescheduling and some loans renewal”. 
**) According to the source (1), p. 8* of the Statistics Section of the same 1998 NBR 
Report, the external debt published series in the period 1986 to 1989 is different from the 
one published in the same report at p. 57*:  
986 987 988 989 
875 272 106 74 
 
Officially, on March 31, 1989 was declared the conclusion of 
Romania’s foreign debt repayment. As evident from the table, the maximum 
repayment effort was in 1988 and 1989 when they were paid more than $ 6 
billion. The ambition to fully pay the external debt was interpreted as a 
“foolish megalomania” and as “foolish pride” generally attributed to 
Nicolae Ceauşescu. 
The currency liquidity hoarding effort intended for the payment of 
Romania’s foreign debt had dramatic effects for the national economy: 
− Imports of raw materials, technologies, equipment, machinery and 
cars were severely restricted, being affected the continued economic growth 
in most sectors of national economy; 
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− Exports were boosted by aggressively restricting the investment 
fund and domestic consumption; 
− Diminished domestic consumption affected the material living 
conditions of the population:  
• limiting food and non-food goods consumption in what was 
left of the domestic output following the exports; 
• excessively reducing consumption for a wide range of 
imported products; 
• rationalization of utilities (supply of electricity, heat, water, etc.). 
Forcing the foreign debt liquidation in the same period when there were 
engaged large unproductive investments (People’s House) or with a long period 
of investments return (Danube-Black Sea Canal) led to serious decrease and 
even stagnation of economic growth committed in previous decades. 
The investment effort and forcing the foreign debt liquidation 
seriously affected the livelihood of millions of citizens. 
On the other hand, one can say that the performance of achieving 
Romania’s financial independence in such a short period was remarkable, 
perhaps unique in history. The overwhelming majority of experts have stated 
categorically that the so-called “achievement” was a “negative performance”, 
with catastrophic consequences for ensuring the continuation of the upward 
trend of economic growth. However, on 31 December 1989 Romania had $ 
1.8 billion foreign exchange availabilities and had to receive loans from 
developing countries amounted to US $ 2.9 billion. [Constantinescu, 2000]  
The evolution of the Romanian economy after 1990 was to confirm 
or deny the gratuity or the uselessness of the extraordinary effort to which 
were subjected the inhabitants of the country during the last decade of 
socialism.  
 
Evolution of the Romania’s foreign trade between 1950 and 1989 
Dynamics of Romania's foreign trade 
The industrialization of the Romanian economy brought about 
significant increases in foreign trade. 
Taking as a basis the year 1950, when net imports (trade deficit) 
reached 187 million currency-lei, until 1980 the exports dynamics was 
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approximately equal to that of imports - 40 times growth. In 1989 exports 
increased 42 times, while imports only 29 times compared to 1950. 
The trade balance was mainly negative between 1950 and 1980. The 
trade deficit accumulated in each of the past three decades passed from 1.7 
billion currency-lei in the period 1950-1959, to 4.5 billion currency-lei in the 
decade 1960-1969 and to 18 billion currency-lei between 1970 and 1980. 
 
The currency-leu had no material existence. It was just a monetary 
unit of account used in the trade with western countries. The name comes 
from the procedure applied to transform in lei the value of goods 
denominated in other freely convertible currencies based on the definition 
(parity) of those currencies into gold. 
According to the 1954 Law, a lion was defined by an amount of 
148.112 mg gold. The dollar was defined by the Law of 1934 at the parity of 
888.671 mg gold. The ratio between the two amounts of gold determined an 
official exchange rate of 6 lei per dollar. With the crisis of the US dollar, 
after 1971, the official exchange rate of leu has appreciated against the 
dollar, after 1980 following the currency market quotations. 
For non-commercial relations (tourist trips, for example) were used 
exchange rates with premium which evolved from 100% in 1957, i.e. one 
US dollar was exchanged for 12 lei, until the completion of  200%  premium 
in 1968, which meant that one dollar was equal to 18 lei. [Kiriţescu, 1997]  
 
Forcing the external debt payment was materialized into external 
trade surpluses, of about 300 billion lei in the period 1980-1989, large 
enough to ensure the necessary currency liquidity. 
 
The evolution of Romania’s export and import between 1950 
and 1989 
Before the end of World War II Romania's foreign trade was 
dominated by exports of agricultural commodities and oil respectively 
imports of finished and semi-finished products. 
Romania’s forced industrialization policy applied during the period 
between 1950 and 1989 is reflected by the change in foreign trade structure.  
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Export and import structure analysis is based on products grouping 
according two criteria: provenance of traded goods on the sector of origin 
(agricultural or industrial) and the degree of products’ processing (stage of 
manufacture: basic-raw, semi-processed or manufactured respectively). 
The structure of exports has radically changed over the period 
analyzed. At the beginning, the agricultural products accounted for 55-60%, 
while the industrial goods (including raw materials supplied by extractive 
industries) 45-50% of total exports. After 1980, the industrial products had 
reached a share of 75-80%, while agricultural products 20-25%. 
At the beginning of the 6th decade, the unprocessed, basic, and 
intermediate goods (with a low processing degree) accounted for about 70% 
of exports, finished products accounting for only 30%. In the 9th decade 
manufacturing goods considerably diversified had reached 65-70% of total 
exports, as the share of raw materials decreased to only 30-35%. 
The literature often mentions that most Romanian products with 
varying processing degrees were not competitive on foreign markets, as 
reflected in the prices at which these products were traded.  
This lack of competitiveness fully corresponds to the League of 
Nations forecast study, Industrialisation et commerce extérieur, 1945: 
developed industrialized countries will always keep a technological 
advantage to countries undergoing industrialization. In other words, the risk 
of an industrial real competition from countries like Romania, Poland or 
Yugoslavia was planned since 1945 as insignificant.  
“The competition from the newly industrialized countries can lead to 
losses in the market of a particular item; but normally these losses tend to be 
offset by gains from the new application that creates, in different ways, the 
competition in question.”4 
The composition of imports reflects in turn, changing of the 
domestic production structure. Imports of capital goods (machinery, 
                                                           
4
 “La concurrence pratiquée par les pays récemment industrialisés peut 
entraîner des pertes sur le marché de tel ou tel article; mais normalement, ces pertes 
tendent à être compensées par des gains résultant de la nouvelle demande que 
suscite, de différentes façons, la concurrence en question.” Industrialisation et 
commerce extérieur, p. 145.  
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technology, transportation) were in the beginning predominant (38.3% in 
1950); its share diminished until 1989 to only a quarter of total imports. 
Reducing the share of the first group was compensated by the increase of 
imports of fuels and raw materials utmost for the productive consumption 
(from less than a quarter of total imports in 1950, this group held more than 
half of Romania’s imports in the period 1980-1989).  
The evolution of the two groups of goods reflects the trade policy 
decisive orientation towards supplying the national economy with the means 
to accelerate the industry development. The two groups represented in 1989 
over 80% of total imports. Overall, consumption of capital goods 
approached a share of 85-90% in 1990. 
Consumer goods intended for population consumption became less 
significant in imports, reaching only more than 15% of the total. 
Corresponding to this evolution of the structure of imports, industrial 
products in all three processing phases (raw materials, semi-finished and 
finished products) mark a permanent increase, contributing at least three 
quarters of the total and a maximum of 85%, the difference being 
represented by products of agricultural origin (raw materials and food). 
 
Foreign trade flows between 1950 and 1989 
In the period 1950-1989 the countries with which Romania has 
maintained foreign trade relations were grouped into two broad categories: 
socialist countries (mainly countries CMEA) and capitalist countries. 
At the end of 40 years, according to data reported in 1989, 
Romania’s foreign trade was distributed as follows: 
− 60% of total trade was run with socialist countries (52% with 
CMEA countries and 8% in other socialist countries); 
− 40% of the total volume of foreign trade was run with capitalist 
countries, of which 25% of the developed capitalist countries and 15% in 
developing countries. [Constantinescu, 2000] 
The evolution of geographic orientation or, better said the geo-
economic development of Romania’s trade was not linear. If at the beginning 
of the 7th decade almost three quarters of the foreign trade ran with socialist 
countries, after 1965 the trade with the West increased year after year, so that 
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between 1975 and 1980, the capitalist countries held between 55 and 59% (of 
these, over a third were developed capitalist countries). 
Significant is the pattern of the different categories of countries. The 
technology import was originally, respectively in the first decade, developed 
as a priority from the socialist countries (mainly the USSR); after 1965, the 
importance of imports of machinery, plant, equipment from the West grew 
significantly.  
On the other hand, it is necessary to highlight the orientation of the 
exports of machinery and equipment in the decades 7, 8 and 9 to the 
developing and least developed countries. It is not insignificant that after 
declaring Romania’s foreign debt payment in 1989, Romania’s outstanding 
debt to these countries amounted to $ 2 billion. [Constantinescu, 2000] 
Along with the effort to pay the external debt in the 9th decade, the 
imports of consumer goods for the population declined from 11% in 1970 to 
7% in 1989. The domestic consumption situation was also aggravated by the 
growth of exports of increasingly diversified and high quality consumer goods. 
 
Conclusions 
The historical time for a possible reduction of disparities through 
industrialization was extremely short for Romania. Basically, given that in 
the 6th decade (1951-1960) the economic growth recorded moderate rates, 
it's only 25 years, from 1964 to 1989, during which the accelerate pace of 
industrialization has reached the maximum. The increase in volume and the 
diversification of import and export structure reflected and enhanced the 
development of industry.  
As a consequence of the socialist industrialization, production 
diversification and domestic supply of consumer goods, as well as the 
imports from both CMEA and the West markets have reshaped consumer 
habits and managed to stir up, to a large extent, the “lust”  for consumption 
of the population. 
Socialism had fulfilled its historic mission: domestic consumer 
demand structure became compatible with the supply structure of the 
major international industrial producers. In 1990 the West had a serious 
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outlet in Romania, a country which has become in less than half a century a 
good potential customer for Western products manufacturing firms. 
Most economic and sociological analysis on Romania’s socialist 
industrialization stressed that most technologies imported during 1950-1980 
were mainly energy-intensive, polluting and uncompetitive in relation to the 
dynamics of technological progress in developed countries. The analyses on 
the worsening gap between the level of industrial development in Romania 
and in European countries are flawed, however, by a dangerous bias, as if 
taken from the socialist ideology: the premise of the approach of Romanian 
economy growth is the continued growth at any cost! 
Moreover, the myth of perpetual growth based on the permanent 
industrial revolution conquered the minds of economists and politicians since the 
nineteenth century. For the good of the peoples that had been isolated from the 
benefits of the “industrial production”, the policy of artificial industrialization 
was considered a vital necessity since the second half of the nineteenth century. 
Promoted with maximum intensity during socialism, industrialization has 
radically changed the consumer habits, as well as the structure of actual and 
potential demand for food and non-food consumer goods. 
In 1990 the structure of the Romanian economy corresponded to the 
standards of an industrial-agrarian economy. Consequently, the structure of 
consumer and most of investment demand had become compatible with the 
structure of the processed industrial products supply from developed countries. 
The artificial growth in socialism has generated a series of negative 
reactions already anticipated by the study of the League of Nations in 1945, 
Industrialization and foreign trade. Still striking is the study’s accurate 
prediction about the cancellation of the industrial development support 
when the international interests will require.5  
By restricting imports, the policy of foreign debt forced payment 
applied in the period 1981-1989 had led to the abandonment of technology 
                                                           
5
 “Toutefois, ce développement [industriel] exige généralement de lourds 
sacrifices dans le pays où il se produit et il s’avérera, en partie, antiéconomique 
lorsque les relations internationales normales seront rétablies”, Industrialisation et 
commerce extérieur, Société des Nations, Genève, 1945, p. 142. 
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transfer and modernization efforts undertaken in the previous decade (1971-
1980). The partial sacrifice of domestic consumption and economic growth 
in favour of the forced payment of external debt was unable to totally 
compromise the chances of resuming growth after 1989.  
The potential of the Romanian economy in 1990 was long called 
“the heavy legacy of Communism”. Indeed, the accumulation of socialism 
decades has proved to be extremely difficult to manage after 1990. With 
very few exceptions, the “achievements of socialism” were wasted mostly in 
the first decade of transition. 
However, without being advanced in the hierarchy of European 
countries, despite the structural imbalances “bequeathed” by the socialist 
regime, the industrial and agricultural potential of Romania in 1989 was 
considerable, constituting a starting stage of EU integration. 
The end of socialism brought with it the hope that all the evils of the 
authoritarian leadership, more and more distant from the reality of the 
Romanian economy, would disappear. Many people dreamed then, in the 
early 90s, the years that were to come were to summarize what was good in 
socialism with what was enshrined as good in capitalism. 
Further development of domestic production, the composition of 
foreign trade and the position of foreign trade balance were influenced and 
determined by the European and international economic conjuncture, as well 
as by the interests of the new political elite to carry or not on the accelerated 
growth policy specific especially to the “Ceauşescu era”. 
Restructuring and harnessing the potential of the Romanian 
economy depended on the economic policy of governments during 
transition (namely pre-accession to the European Union). What they did 
with the “heavy legacy” will be presented in another article.  
Here we must conclude that socialism was nothing but a historically 
necessary stage towards globalisation. Who regards globalisation as an 
unavoidable process should also praise the “socialism achievements”! This, 
at least, if we follow out J.A. Schumpeter, considering that “the subject 
matter of economics is essentially a unique process in history time.” 
[Schumpeter, 1954]   
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